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Abstract— The so-called Posthuman question - the birth of 
organisms generated by the encounter of biological and artificial 
entities (humanoid robots, cyborgs and so on) – is now on the 
agenda of science and, more generally, of contemporary society. 
This is an issue of enormous importance, which not only poses 
ethical questions but also, and above all, methodological questions 
about how it will be achieved on a scientific plane. How such 
entities will be born and what their functions will be? For example, 
what kind of consciousness will they be equipped with, in view of 
the function of consciousness for distinguishing the Self from 
others, which is the foundation of the interactive life of 
relationships? Many scholars believe that rapid technological 
progress will lead to the emergence of organisms that will simulate 
the functions of the mind, learn from their experiences, decode 
real-world information, and plan their actions and choices based 
on their own values elaborated from vast amounts of data and 
metadata. In the not-too-distant future, it is believed that these 
entities will acquire awareness and, consequently, decisional 
freedom, and perhaps even their own unique morals. In this paper, 
we try to show that the path towards this goal cannot avoid 
clarification of the problems that neuroscience has ahead of it. 
These problems concern: a) the way in which consciousness comes 
about on the basis of well-defined brain processes; b) how it 
represents its own organization and not a simple brain function; 
c) how simultaneously contains multiple distinct contents, each 
with its own intentionality; d) how it expresses dynamic 
evolutionary relations and not a set of phenomena that may be 
isolated; e) finally, how its order is not rigidly hierarchical, but is 
supported by a multiplicity of horizontal levels, each of which is in 
structural and functional continuum with different phenomenal 
events. The empirical and theoretical research effort on this topic 
provides an intensive contribution to the development of IC 
Technologies. 
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I. METHODOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY 
HE methodology of the study of consciousness should 
comprise three essential aspects: 1) the search for 
neurophysiological correlates; 2) the causal analysis of this 
correlation; 3) the identification of causal links that allow a 
reproducibility that can confirm the explanatory hypotheses [1]. 
Naturally, ideal conditions of causality only exist in healthy 
subjects. Moreover, many structures, each with its own 
neurophysiological correlates, are involved in such study [2,3] 
and the extremely complex relations between consciousness 
and awareness must also be taken into account. In view of these 
considerations the experimental conditions for approaching an 
analysis of the neural correlates of consciousness appear rather 
complex. Although we can only access its contents through 
relevant verbal reports that can be shared by a third-party [4,5], 
there are also behaviors, gestures and movements related to 
neural activities, which can be detected electrophysiologically 
or by brain imaging. In any analysis, at least three types of 
neural activity should be considered: one associated with 
conscious mental representations, one associated with sensory 
stimuli and one related to behavior [6]. It seems inevitable, 
therefore, that in the field of consciousness, more than in other 
scientific investigations, theory must precede and accompany 
experimentation. Several mechanisms and dynamics generating 
phenomena of variation and selection (molecular, 
supramolecular, cellular, cellular networks, networks of 
networks) are involved in generating living organisms perfectly 
adapted to the natural environment [7]. 
An elective method of study of consciousness consists of 
observing brain activation (PET, fMRI, MEG, event-related 
potentials), allowing exploration of the central nervous system 
before and after an adequate stimulus: the presentation of 
ambiguous visual stimuli, the transition from general anesthesia 
to awakening, the transition from the vegetative state to the 
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minimal conscious state etc. [8]. For example, in a patient first 
in vegetative state, then 'minimally conscious', the resumption 
of the activity of the thalamus-cortical circuit at a high 
oscillatory frequency confirms the importance of connections 
between the intralaminar nuclei of thalamus and the frontal and 
parietal associative cortices in the maintenance of 
consciousness [9]. 
Because of its crucial evolutionary functions, consciousness 
cannot be restricted to a limited region of the brain. The 
classical studies of Moruzzi and Magoun [10] showed that the 
Ascending Reticular Activating System (ARAS) – a system 
composed by reticular formation, thalamus and thalamus-
cortical projection system – presides over the widespread 
activation of the cerebral cortex, generating the states of waking 
and vigilance necessary for the constitution of the contents of 
consciousness. However, ARAS is not restricted only to the 
brainstem reticular nuclei [11]. In fact, its structures project 
downwards to the spinal cord and upwards to the cerebral 
hemispheres. Furthermore, each of its constituent nuclei has 
particular anatomical, physiological and chemical 
characteristics. Circumscribing the ARAS at the midbrain level 
is, therefore, restrictive [12]. Many brainstem nuclei that 
modulate the functioning of the cortex reside in the pontine 
tegmentum, others in the pons and the bulb. It is also relevant 
that some nuclei of the brainstem go beyond the thalamus to 
connect directly with the fronto-basal cortex, from which 
diffuse bilateral projections to the cerebral cortex originate. 
Moreover, other nuclei go beyond both the thalamus and the 
fronto-basal cortex to reach wide areas of the cerebral cortex 
and other nuclei again are connected with the reticular nucleus 
of the thalamus but not with the intralaminar nuclei [13]. These 
factors allow us to consider the functions of ARAS as much 
wider and more complex than the simple 'desynchronisation' of 
the cerebral cortex, although the latter is essential to the state of 
alertness and to attention [14], while there are non-specific 
thalamo-cortical projections, such as the activation of the 
thalamo-cortical circuit at high oscillatorry frequency, 
fundamental for the essential functions of consciousness [15].  
II. AN ENDLESS DISPUTE  
The brain has frequently been represented as a multitude of 
specialized and distributed microprocessors competing with 
each other to access a Global Workspace for the coordination 
and control of information [16]. In this scenario an enormous 
amount of information would contribute, below the threshold of 
consciousness, to determining conscious subjectivity. At the 
foundation of this system would be the thalamocortical circuit 
which, with upward and downward projections, could 
transform the distinct contents into expressions of meaning 
[17]. The Global Workspace – which helps to clarify the nature 
of the unity of consciousness and distinguish between the 
conscious global workspace and unconscious levels – is 
constituted as a stable context-purpose within which 
consciousness determines its own contents among countless 
competitive-cooperative interactions and multiple sense-
perceptive sources [18]. In the second half of the 1990s, starting 
from experiments on vision in primates, the idea took form that 
at the origin of consciousness there is a system similar to the 
activation of neurons in layers V and VI of the cerebral cortex, 
mediated by thalamocortical oscillations [19]. At the origin of 
consciousness would be a form of neural activity of elevated 
visual areas that would project directly onto the prefrontal 
areas, creating an intermediate space of representations 
dislocated between a lower plane of sensations and a higher 
plane of cognition. Among the phenomenal and cognitive 
dimensions in which learning, reasoning and intelligence would 
take place a homunculus, in any case below the conscious level, 
would perceive the world through the senses, elaborating, 
planning and performing voluntary actions [20]. This double 
dimension is present in Edelman's proposed distinction between 
a primary consciousness (a multi-modal space that brings 
together different sources of information) and a higher 
consciousness (contemporary to the birth of language) that 
would allow the Self to evoke and narrate his own experiences, 
freeing the organism from the biological constraints of the here 
and now [21,22]. In this scheme, primary consciousness would 
connect the axiological-categorical memory to current 
perceptual organization, while higher consciousness would 
operate a synthesis between the memory of values and the 
memory of categories distributed in the temporal, frontal and 
parietal areas. From the comparison between these two types of 
neural organization, on one hand there is the non-Self that has 
sensory relationships with the world through experience, and on 
the other, the Self that, stimulated by social interactions, 
acquires rich semantics and a syntactic memory for concepts, 
would together constitute higher consciousness. Although 
Edelman [23] is willing, in his most recent works, to consider 
subjectivity in the conscious sphere, his general theoretical 
framework lacks references to external subjectivity coding and 
decoding messages with a symbolic alphabet. Edelman made a 
distinction between actual information (the number and 
probability of states making a difference in the Self system) and 
information which measures the independence of sub-sets 
through the bipartition of an isolated system. The complexity 
varies with the neuroanatomical organization: i.e. it would be 
minimal when the connections are statistically distributed and, 
instead, maximal when it is connected to defined groups of 
neurons. In this sense, the higher the information links between 
the subsets and the system, the greater the complexity. A crucial 
role in conscious experience would be played by an aggregate 
of neurons belonging to the thalamocortical system, which 
operates in a timespan of a hundred milliseconds in 
collaboration with other areas of the brain, giving origin to 
phenomena, with variable and dynamic spatial distributions, 
that are decisive for brain integration. Such integration would 
not be limited to the work of a subset of neurons, but would 
vary, from moment to moment, in the same individual and from 
one individual to another. Thus, it would be unified and 
differentiated at the same time. Fascinating though it is, this 
model does not make it clear how consciousness unifies such 
different and distant modularity [23].  
Years ago, the hypothesis of the existence of a dynamic, 
globally integrated recruitment of representations with 
characteristics of unity, diversity, variability and competition in 
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phenomena of variation and selection (molecular, 
supramolecular, cellular, cellular networks, networks of 
networks) are involved in generating living organisms perfectly 
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minimal when the connections are statistically distributed and, 
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of neurons belonging to the thalamocortical system, which 
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collaboration with other areas of the brain, giving origin to 
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not be limited to the work of a subset of neurons, but would 
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coherent and cohesive form [41]. Under normal circumstances, 
we experience a structured world of distinct and ordered objects 
in space within significant spatial-temporal patterns, organized 
according to regularity and extramodal (colour, shape, etc.) and 
intramodal (proprioceptive, auditory and visual) content. In 
reality, representative cohesion is not an invariant feature of 
conscious experience, but the outcome of a selection through 
which the brain seeks a path towards its own integration. Thus, 
the appearance of the Self has to do with an ordering activity of 
consciousness, which elaborates and sustains this multiplicity 
of local contents generated by conscious experience, in relation 
to one another.  
A plural model of consciousness could explain the birth of 
the Self, with a space of centrencephalic functional integration 
[15, 42, 43] that supports both integration and global 
communication at its base. Consciousness would thus appear as 
a multiple unity rather than an undifferentiated unity. Let us be 
clear: the unification of consciousness is not a matter of 
uniqueness, but of representative cohesion: a cohesion 
plausibly operated by cortico-cortical circuits, and one that 
would explain how a Self emerges from the multiple 
representative activities of the brain. All conscious experiences 
are, in fact, unified within a conscious field [44] Hence, unity 
is implicit in qualitative subjectivity. But if our awareness is 
determined by infinite parts, what we perceive is not just one 
subject with different states of consciousness, but many 
different fields of unified consciousness. In other words, the 
unity of awareness follows subjectivity and quality, because 
there is no way to have subjectivity and quality without unity.  
It can never be stressed enough that there is a need to 
distinguish instantaneous unity from the organized unification 
of conscious sequences that we obtain, for example, from iconic 
memory [1]. For non-pathological forms of consciousness and 
memory it is essential that the conscious sequence is organized 
in a certain order [45]. For example, comprehension of a 
sentence is determined by the ability to remember its beginning 
through its duration and to reach its end producing a coherent 
discourse [46]. Now, if instantaneous unity is part of the 
definition of consciousness, then unity organized through time 
(duration) is essential to consciousness, even if it is not 
necessary for the existence of conscious subjectivity. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the prodigious advances in neuroscientific research, 
the problem of consciousness remains an unsolved mystery. In 
the history of science, it has often been the case that a solution 
to a problem raises new questions. This also applies to the 
consciousness. The more we learn about it, the more we need 
specific, articulate and refined answers and knowledge about 
what we do not know yet. In this sense, achieving an adequate 
understanding of consciousness in all its aspects will require 
many other developments, both theoretical and experimental 
[47]. In this paper, for example, we could not consider 
important distinctions such as between primary consciousness 
and self-consciousness, nor the close relationship between 
consciousness and memory or between consciousness and 
language. We have not even mentioned the great practical 
difficulties that hinder the measurement of the ability to 
integrate information in a living brain. Nor has it been possible 
here to consider the many implications of the equivalence 
between consciousness and the ability to integrate information. 
Although it has been on the confines of scientific debate for 
almost a century, the literature on consciousness is growing day 
by day with the contributions of thinkers and researchers from 
different disciplines [48]. So far, the Galilean categories have 
allowed us great success in the explanation of physical 
phenomena, but they have proved insufficient so far for 
understanding the nature of consciousness. No one knows how 
a physical system (the brain, the nervous system, a set of 
neurons) is able to generate conscious experience. The brain is, 
like so many things, a physical object, but we are unable to 
explain how a certain system can produce conscious 
experience, whether there is a specific element that gives rise to 
consciousness, and whether it develops suddenly or gradually. 
Now, if neuroscience is unable to answer any of these 
questions, could the way forward be to address the issue 
through the construction of organisms with “artificial 
consciousness” [49]? Would it be ethically implausible to try to 
understand consciousness through refined forms of artificial 
intelligence? 
At the beginning of the third millennium, the decisive turning 
point in human history - the understanding of consciousness - 
could be achieved through AI [50]. So far, along with other 
essential elements, there has been insufficient technological 
know-how to build an artificial conscious entity, but now that 
robots are starting to look like human beings – both in terms of 
computing power and physical structure – the solution may be 
closer. According to some thinkers, within a few decades the 
construction of super-intelligent machines will allow us to 
transcend the human condition [51, 52]. The use of nanorobotic 
systems will help us to generate creative ideas, to think 
independently, to expand our memory systems, probably 
connecting our minds to the cloud, the great and potentially 
infinite archive of information stored on the Internet [53]. Our 
very way of thinking will become a hybrid expression of 
biological and non-biological elements. As the cloud gets more 
sophisticated, we shall probably update ourselves. With time, 
the role of non-biological consciousness will become more and 
more important and, as a result, our way of thinking will 
become more and more non-biological. Once this level is 
reached, it is reasonable to think that there will be positive 
effects in the development of AI-driven devices, which will 
generate more and more powerful and sophisticated AI [54, 55, 
56]. In this sense, the Subsumption architecture model by 
Brooks takes on interest: it is a control architecture, conceived 
in opposition to the traditional AI. According to this model, the 
behaviour of robots can be oriented through symbolic mental 
representations of the world, combining sensory information 
with the selection of the action in an intimate and bottom-up 
way [57]. According to Brooks, the construction of an 
embodied agent is articulated on different levels: a) an 
integrated physical control system; b) an internal relation of the 
behavioral layers directly rooted in the world percieved by 
robots; c) the interaction of these modules, which generates 
a circumscribed neural space was advanced [24]. According to 
this hypothesis, the work of a set of neurons, up to the 
constitution of real neural maps, connected each other over 
short distances (but relatively autonomous), would give rise to 
phenomena such as vision, language and motility. In this model 
long axons – particularly abundant in the cortical layers I, II and 
III – present in large numbers in the prefrontal cortex, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal cortex. Here, 
a critical role is played by the frontal lobes, play a relevant role 
[25]. By subjecting individuals to a multimodal cognitive task 
(such as the Stroop test) the authors observed that the meaning 
of the read word was pronounced relatively automatically in 
accordance with the subject matter, whatever the colour of the 
ink, and although there was a strong inconsistency between it 
and the meaning of the word. The effort made in correction 
would indicate the recruitment of workspace neurons which, 
through trial and error, would control the processing of 
information by processors working from the bottom up. The 
computer simulation of the model would not only clarify the 
dynamics of global representation, but would be predictive of 
the dynamics of brain iconography during the execution of the 
task [26] 
The ability of consciousness to integrate information raises 
the questions of how much a physical system can become 
conscious and what kind of consciousness it is endowed with. 
It can be presumed that part of the organization of these cortical 
areas is responsible for the different quality of resulting 
conscious experiences. According to Tononi [27, 28] the 
qualitative question of consciousness can be addressed as a 
natural extension of the quantitative (neurophysiological) 
problem. In other words, qualia would indicate the capacity of 
a system to integrate information (blue, red, etc.) due to the 
informational connections that bind the elements of a complex, 
while the types of informational relations would largely be 
determined by the nervous connections within (and between) 
each of the different cortical areas of information integration. 
According to Tononi, with many experimental and clinical 
neurobiological observations it would also be possible to 
measure consciousness consistently, just like physical 
phenomena such as entropy or temperature. According to the 
theory, in fact, the multiple manifestations of consciousness 
would be due to the modes of integration of information [28]: 
levels of consciousness would a be direct function of 
information integration and vice versa. 
 
III. UNITAS MULTIPLEX 
For over two centuries scholars have supported the idea of 
the unity (and continuity) of consciousness over time [29]. 
Today, instead, copious evidence shows that consciousness is a 
multifaceted process that simultaneously contains distinct 
contents, each with its own intentionality [30, 31, 32]. 
However, how does this internal plurality unify the different 
contents and the underlying biophysical-molecular mechanisms 
that are integrated into the experience? [33, 34]. This model has 
two possible variants: in the first, consciousness would be 
generated by a single central neural system: information would 
be brought to representation and then to consciousness; in the 
second, consciousness would emerge from the co-activation of 
programmed contents from distributed structures in the brain 
which, in a unitary process, would simultaneously process 
innumerable pieces of information. Yet, if the simultaneous 
plurality of consciousness is admitted, what is the interface and 
the relationship between the brain infrastructure and the activity 
of consciousness? In short, how is the content of the experience 
integrated into the brain? The distinction between a plural 
model and a unified theory of consciousness starts from here 
[35].  
However, whether conscious experience is the result of the 
work of a central neural system, where informer content must 
be represented in order to be brought to consciousness, or the 
result of a unitary process of consciousness-creation in which 
the brain acts by treating many distinct pieces of information 
simultaneously, consciousness turns out to be a monodrome 
phenomenon which takes place exclusively in the brain. On the 
contrary, if the activity of the individual and distinct elements 
are generated by cerebral mechanisms distributed in the brain, 
then this gives rise to a plural activity of consciousness. Here, 
contents independent of each other and exposed to intra-sensory 
and intersensory influences affect each other and co-determine 
conscious content. In a plural model, in which the mechanisms 
of consciousness are multiple and localized, these interactions 
are perfectly constant. Ramachandran [36] has often insisted on 
the concrete plausibility of a model that integrates visual, 
auditory, tactile, proprioceptive and other experiences. These 
individual spheres can be altered or marginalized, relatively 
independently, without affecting the others [37]. 
Evidence on the consequences of lesions and ablation of 
brain areas shows that it is possible to lose the ability to visually 
capture motion (while preserving other aspects of visual 
experience) [38], and that it is possible to lose the sensation of 
color, while preserving the visual experience and movement. 
Studies on the degree and type of functional specialization and 
brain localization in subjects with lesion deficits have shown 
that the brain works on a large scale, between modes and 
domains that are reflected in precise anatomical districts 
(primary visual processing in the occipital cortex, auditory 
processing in the temporal cortex, design and memory 
processing in the frontal cortex), while precise functions are 
performed in well-demarcated anatomical districts and loci: for 
example, visual motion in V5 and color in V4. The areas of the 
brain that program particular information content are those in 
which they come to awareness. For example, different events 
presented simultaneously in a visual scene are not perceived 
with the same duration. This widespread asynchrony shows 
how consciousness, more than a unitary faculty, is the 
integrated outcome of many micro-events [32, 39] 
Yet, if consciousness has this plural nature, why do we 
perceive ourselves as unitary subjects? And how does the Self 
emerge from such multiplicity? One could discuss the meaning 
of the unitary subject and its inner core that we define as Self at 
length. Without getting into such controversial territory [40], 
one could say that the Self emerges when the individual events 
produced by the brain obtain a sufficiently representative, 
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coherent and cohesive form [41]. Under normal circumstances, 
we experience a structured world of distinct and ordered objects 
in space within significant spatial-temporal patterns, organized 
according to regularity and extramodal (colour, shape, etc.) and 
intramodal (proprioceptive, auditory and visual) content. In 
reality, representative cohesion is not an invariant feature of 
conscious experience, but the outcome of a selection through 
which the brain seeks a path towards its own integration. Thus, 
the appearance of the Self has to do with an ordering activity of 
consciousness, which elaborates and sustains this multiplicity 
of local contents generated by conscious experience, in relation 
to one another.  
A plural model of consciousness could explain the birth of 
the Self, with a space of centrencephalic functional integration 
[15, 42, 43] that supports both integration and global 
communication at its base. Consciousness would thus appear as 
a multiple unity rather than an undifferentiated unity. Let us be 
clear: the unification of consciousness is not a matter of 
uniqueness, but of representative cohesion: a cohesion 
plausibly operated by cortico-cortical circuits, and one that 
would explain how a Self emerges from the multiple 
representative activities of the brain. All conscious experiences 
are, in fact, unified within a conscious field [44] Hence, unity 
is implicit in qualitative subjectivity. But if our awareness is 
determined by infinite parts, what we perceive is not just one 
subject with different states of consciousness, but many 
different fields of unified consciousness. In other words, the 
unity of awareness follows subjectivity and quality, because 
there is no way to have subjectivity and quality without unity.  
It can never be stressed enough that there is a need to 
distinguish instantaneous unity from the organized unification 
of conscious sequences that we obtain, for example, from iconic 
memory [1]. For non-pathological forms of consciousness and 
memory it is essential that the conscious sequence is organized 
in a certain order [45]. For example, comprehension of a 
sentence is determined by the ability to remember its beginning 
through its duration and to reach its end producing a coherent 
discourse [46]. Now, if instantaneous unity is part of the 
definition of consciousness, then unity organized through time 
(duration) is essential to consciousness, even if it is not 
necessary for the existence of conscious subjectivity. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the prodigious advances in neuroscientific research, 
the problem of consciousness remains an unsolved mystery. In 
the history of science, it has often been the case that a solution 
to a problem raises new questions. This also applies to the 
consciousness. The more we learn about it, the more we need 
specific, articulate and refined answers and knowledge about 
what we do not know yet. In this sense, achieving an adequate 
understanding of consciousness in all its aspects will require 
many other developments, both theoretical and experimental 
[47]. In this paper, for example, we could not consider 
important distinctions such as between primary consciousness 
and self-consciousness, nor the close relationship between 
consciousness and memory or between consciousness and 
language. We have not even mentioned the great practical 
difficulties that hinder the measurement of the ability to 
integrate information in a living brain. Nor has it been possible 
here to consider the many implications of the equivalence 
between consciousness and the ability to integrate information. 
Although it has been on the confines of scientific debate for 
almost a century, the literature on consciousness is growing day 
by day with the contributions of thinkers and researchers from 
different disciplines [48]. So far, the Galilean categories have 
allowed us great success in the explanation of physical 
phenomena, but they have proved insufficient so far for 
understanding the nature of consciousness. No one knows how 
a physical system (the brain, the nervous system, a set of 
neurons) is able to generate conscious experience. The brain is, 
like so many things, a physical object, but we are unable to 
explain how a certain system can produce conscious 
experience, whether there is a specific element that gives rise to 
consciousness, and whether it develops suddenly or gradually. 
Now, if neuroscience is unable to answer any of these 
questions, could the way forward be to address the issue 
through the construction of organisms with “artificial 
consciousness” [49]? Would it be ethically implausible to try to 
understand consciousness through refined forms of artificial 
intelligence? 
At the beginning of the third millennium, the decisive turning 
point in human history - the understanding of consciousness - 
could be achieved through AI [50]. So far, along with other 
essential elements, there has been insufficient technological 
know-how to build an artificial conscious entity, but now that 
robots are starting to look like human beings – both in terms of 
computing power and physical structure – the solution may be 
closer. According to some thinkers, within a few decades the 
construction of super-intelligent machines will allow us to 
transcend the human condition [51, 52]. The use of nanorobotic 
systems will help us to generate creative ideas, to think 
independently, to expand our memory systems, probably 
connecting our minds to the cloud, the great and potentially 
infinite archive of information stored on the Internet [53]. Our 
very way of thinking will become a hybrid expression of 
biological and non-biological elements. As the cloud gets more 
sophisticated, we shall probably update ourselves. With time, 
the role of non-biological consciousness will become more and 
more important and, as a result, our way of thinking will 
become more and more non-biological. Once this level is 
reached, it is reasonable to think that there will be positive 
effects in the development of AI-driven devices, which will 
generate more and more powerful and sophisticated AI [54, 55, 
56]. In this sense, the Subsumption architecture model by 
Brooks takes on interest: it is a control architecture, conceived 
in opposition to the traditional AI. According to this model, the 
behaviour of robots can be oriented through symbolic mental 
representations of the world, combining sensory information 
with the selection of the action in an intimate and bottom-up 
way [57]. According to Brooks, the construction of an 
embodied agent is articulated on different levels: a) an 
integrated physical control system; b) an internal relation of the 
behavioral layers directly rooted in the world percieved by 
robots; c) the interaction of these modules, which generates 
a circumscribed neural space was advanced [24]. According to 
this hypothesis, the work of a set of neurons, up to the 
constitution of real neural maps, connected each other over 
short distances (but relatively autonomous), would give rise to 
phenomena such as vision, language and motility. In this model 
long axons – particularly abundant in the cortical layers I, II and 
III – present in large numbers in the prefrontal cortex, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal cortex. Here, 
a critical role is played by the frontal lobes, play a relevant role 
[25]. By subjecting individuals to a multimodal cognitive task 
(such as the Stroop test) the authors observed that the meaning 
of the read word was pronounced relatively automatically in 
accordance with the subject matter, whatever the colour of the 
ink, and although there was a strong inconsistency between it 
and the meaning of the word. The effort made in correction 
would indicate the recruitment of workspace neurons which, 
through trial and error, would control the processing of 
information by processors working from the bottom up. The 
computer simulation of the model would not only clarify the 
dynamics of global representation, but would be predictive of 
the dynamics of brain iconography during the execution of the 
task [26] 
The ability of consciousness to integrate information raises 
the questions of how much a physical system can become 
conscious and what kind of consciousness it is endowed with. 
It can be presumed that part of the organization of these cortical 
areas is responsible for the different quality of resulting 
conscious experiences. According to Tononi [27, 28] the 
qualitative question of consciousness can be addressed as a 
natural extension of the quantitative (neurophysiological) 
problem. In other words, qualia would indicate the capacity of 
a system to integrate information (blue, red, etc.) due to the 
informational connections that bind the elements of a complex, 
while the types of informational relations would largely be 
determined by the nervous connections within (and between) 
each of the different cortical areas of information integration. 
According to Tononi, with many experimental and clinical 
neurobiological observations it would also be possible to 
measure consciousness consistently, just like physical 
phenomena such as entropy or temperature. According to the 
theory, in fact, the multiple manifestations of consciousness 
would be due to the modes of integration of information [28]: 
levels of consciousness would a be direct function of 
information integration and vice versa. 
 
III. UNITAS MULTIPLEX 
For over two centuries scholars have supported the idea of 
the unity (and continuity) of consciousness over time [29]. 
Today, instead, copious evidence shows that consciousness is a 
multifaceted process that simultaneously contains distinct 
contents, each with its own intentionality [30, 31, 32]. 
However, how does this internal plurality unify the different 
contents and the underlying biophysical-molecular mechanisms 
that are integrated into the experience? [33, 34]. This model has 
two possible variants: in the first, consciousness would be 
generated by a single central neural system: information would 
be brought to representation and then to consciousness; in the 
second, consciousness would emerge from the co-activation of 
programmed contents from distributed structures in the brain 
which, in a unitary process, would simultaneously process 
innumerable pieces of information. Yet, if the simultaneous 
plurality of consciousness is admitted, what is the interface and 
the relationship between the brain infrastructure and the activity 
of consciousness? In short, how is the content of the experience 
integrated into the brain? The distinction between a plural 
model and a unified theory of consciousness starts from here 
[35].  
However, whether conscious experience is the result of the 
work of a central neural system, where informer content must 
be represented in order to be brought to consciousness, or the 
result of a unitary process of consciousness-creation in which 
the brain acts by treating many distinct pieces of information 
simultaneously, consciousness turns out to be a monodrome 
phenomenon which takes place exclusively in the brain. On the 
contrary, if the activity of the individual and distinct elements 
are generated by cerebral mechanisms distributed in the brain, 
then this gives rise to a plural activity of consciousness. Here, 
contents independent of each other and exposed to intra-sensory 
and intersensory influences affect each other and co-determine 
conscious content. In a plural model, in which the mechanisms 
of consciousness are multiple and localized, these interactions 
are perfectly constant. Ramachandran [36] has often insisted on 
the concrete plausibility of a model that integrates visual, 
auditory, tactile, proprioceptive and other experiences. These 
individual spheres can be altered or marginalized, relatively 
independently, without affecting the others [37]. 
Evidence on the consequences of lesions and ablation of 
brain areas shows that it is possible to lose the ability to visually 
capture motion (while preserving other aspects of visual 
experience) [38], and that it is possible to lose the sensation of 
color, while preserving the visual experience and movement. 
Studies on the degree and type of functional specialization and 
brain localization in subjects with lesion deficits have shown 
that the brain works on a large scale, between modes and 
domains that are reflected in precise anatomical districts 
(primary visual processing in the occipital cortex, auditory 
processing in the temporal cortex, design and memory 
processing in the frontal cortex), while precise functions are 
performed in well-demarcated anatomical districts and loci: for 
example, visual motion in V5 and color in V4. The areas of the 
brain that program particular information content are those in 
which they come to awareness. For example, different events 
presented simultaneously in a visual scene are not perceived 
with the same duration. This widespread asynchrony shows 
how consciousness, more than a unitary faculty, is the 
integrated outcome of many micro-events [32, 39] 
Yet, if consciousness has this plural nature, why do we 
perceive ourselves as unitary subjects? And how does the Self 
emerge from such multiplicity? One could discuss the meaning 
of the unitary subject and its inner core that we define as Self at 
length. Without getting into such controversial territory [40], 
one could say that the Self emerges when the individual events 
produced by the brain obtain a sufficiently representative, 
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of these modules, which generates emerging properties 
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As far as the acquisition of new skills through self-learning 
is concerned, it cannot be excluded that a brain capable of 
extraordinary calculations may make the development of a new 
and more powerful sensory sphere possible, even if it will be 
very difficult to replicate the intricate work done by the long-
tried adaptive process of the species and to define the 
sophisticated processing of information as emotions such as 
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Abstract—Cognitive Infocommunications involve a
combination of informatics and telecommunications. In the future, 
infocommunication is expected to become more intelligent and life 
supportive. Privacy is one of the most critical concerns in 
infocommunications. Encryption is a well-recognized technology 
that ensures privacy; however, it is not easy to completely hide 
personal information. One technique to protect privacy is by 
finding confidential words in a file or a website and changing them 
into meaningless words. In this paper, we investigate a technology 
used to hide confidential words taken from judicial precedents. In 
the Japanese judicial field, details of most precedents are not made 
available to the public on the Japanese court web pages to protect 
the persons involved. To ensure privacy, confidential words, such 
as personal names, are replaced by other meaningless words. This 
operation takes time and effort because it is done manually. 
Therefore, it is desirable to automatically predict confidential 
words. We proposed a method for predicting confidential words in 
Japanese judicial precedents by using part-of-speech (POS)
tagging with neural networks. As a result, we obtained 88% 
accuracy improvement over a previous model. In this paper, we
describe the mechanism of our proposed model and the prediction 
results using perplexity. Then, we evaluated how our proposed 
model was useful for the actual precedents by using recall and 
precision. As a result, our proposed model could detect
confidential words in certain Japanese precedents.
Index Terms—confidential word, neural network, Part of 
Speech (POS) tag, perplexity (PPL), precision, recall  
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Cognitive Infocommunications  
Cognitive Infocommunications (CogInfoCom) [1][2] 
involves a combination of informatics and communications. 
CogInfoCom systems extend human cognitive capabilities by 
providing fast infocommunications links to huge repositories of 
information produced by the shared cognitive activities of 
social communities [3]. CogInfoCom is expected to become
more intelligent, and it would even have the ability to support 
life. Fig. 1 shows the idea of CogInfoCom. Clearly, privacy is 
one of the most critical concerns in infocommunications.
Encryption is a well-recognized technology used for ensuring 
privacy; however, encryption does not effectively hide personal 
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information completely. One technique to protect privacy is to 
determine the confidential words in a file or a website and 
convert them into meaningless words. CogInfoCom makes a
network intelligent and automatically changes confidential 
words into meaningless words.
B. IT-Based Court: Cyber Court  
Globalization of the economy, international trade, and 
disputes present new demands on judiciaries worldwide. At the 
same time, advances in information communication technology 
(ICT) offer opportunities to judicial policymakers to make 
justice more accessible, transparent, and effective. 
By introducing ICT, many countries have allowed easy 
access judicial documents easily. Such a justice system 
empowered by ICT is called a “cyber court.” A pioneering 
study of a cyber court system is Courtroom 21 [4], which started 
in 1993 in the College of William & Mary as a joint project 
between the university and the National Center for State Courts 
in the United States of America.
In Japan, the prototype for the first civil trial was developed 
in the Toin University of Yokohama in 2004 [5, 6], and its 
effectiveness was proved particularly to the Japanese citizen 
judge system [7]. An experiment with a remote trial was also 
conducted [8]. The Investments for the Future Strategy 2017 by 
the Japanese Cabinet Office includes ICT conversion for trials 
to accelerate the trials and improve the efficiency of the judicial
system [9].
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Fig. 1. Infocommunication model
